French firms’ strategies for protecting their intellectual property. by Legros, Diego & Gallié, Emilie-Pauline
The use of intellectual property rights by French
ﬁrms
Emilie-Pauline Galliéand Diègo Legrosy
September 25, 2009
Abstract: In attempting to appropriate their innovations, ﬁrms can chose from
a range of mechanisms, including patents, trade secrets and lead-times. Yet, little is
known about how ﬁrms choose diﬀerent appropriability mechanisms. The aim of this
paper is to determine how the use of intellectual property rights (IPs) by French ﬁrms
is related to their characteristics, activities, competitive strategies and the industry
sector in which they operate. Among their characteristics, we test the role of the
human resource strategies in keeping employees. Our empirical model is based on
the French 2004 Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Our results show that ﬁrms
have diﬀerent strategies in the choice of the means of protection according to their
basic economic characteristics of ﬁrms, their activities and industry environment.
They also put in evidence of the role of human resources strategies. Firms that
ﬁnance R&D training prefer to use non-statutory means.
Keywords: Appropriability, Intellectual property rights, Innovation, Human re-
sources strategies, Multivariate probit.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C35, O32, O34.
Acknowledgements : We are grateful to C. Beaudry and R. Guichard for their helpful
suggestions and comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
Corresponding author: Institut pour le Management de la Recherche et de l’Innovation, Uni-
versité Paris IX Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16.
Phone: +33 (0)1 4405 4819, Fax : +33 (0)1 4405 4849, E-mail: emilie-pauline.gallie@dauphine.fr
yLaboratoire d’Économie et de Gestion, 2 boulevard Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 DIJON CEDEX,
Phone: +33 (0)3 8039 3520 Fax: +33 (0)3 8039 5443, E-mail: diego.legros@u-bourgogne.fr
11 Introduction
The protection of intellectual property (IP) is an often debated crucial question
in economics. Patenting seems to be the most obvious mechanism of protection.
However, Scherer et al. (1959) and large-scale industrial surveys carried out over
recent decades (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 1996, 2000) show that ﬁrms improve
the conditions for appropriating the returns on their innovations through diﬀerent
channels, including of course patenting but also lead time and moving quickly down
the learning curve, secrecy, exploiting their reputation and implementing sales and
services eﬀorts (Mendonça et al., 2004). The economic literature searches to identify
which is the most eﬃcient. It appears that the ranking of these strategies is not
steady and notably varies according to the sector of the ﬁrm and the nature of the
protected innovations. Moreover, few studies have been undertaken to understand
the strategies which lead ﬁrms to use one of these mechanisms and the potential
complementarities which can exist between them, as a ﬁrm can use diﬀerent protec-
tion.
In this context, we aim to go further in the understanding of the choice of
mechanisms of protection by the ﬁrms. We analyse their use by French ﬁrms. We
suppose that the sector and the nature of innovation, but also the human resources
strategies and ﬁrms characteristics may inﬂuence the choice. The aim of the study
is then to use the fourth Community Innovation Survey (CIS4) data to provide
empirical estimates of the propensity of choosing one mechanism of protection rather
than another.
Our study is original as it includes diﬀerent explanatory variables which have
not been included together in previous studies. Thus, we test the impact of sector,
innovation and ﬁrms characteristics, including human resources strategies such as
training and wages. The results show that some means of protection can be explained
by very similar factors while other reveal very diﬀerent strategies. The strategies are
partly correlated. The remainder of the paper is organized in ﬁve sections. Section 2
presents a brief overview of the literature on the diﬀerent appropriability strategies
that ﬁrms can use. Section 3 explains the estimation methodology. Section 4 outlines
the database. Section 5 reports the results and contains a discussion. Finally, section
6 concludes.
2 Why do ﬁrms use intellectual properties rights?
2.1 Diversity of mechanisms of protection
Knowledge is a peculiar good because its cost of reproduction is low, in comparison
with how costly it is to produce it in the ﬁrst place. Innovations are thus vulnerable
to copying and imitation (Arrow, 1962). In economic terms, knowledge has the
attributes of a public good. Without IP mechanisms of protection, private producers
of knowledge would not be able to appropriate the value of their investments, and
this nonappropriability of beneﬁts would lead to underproduction of new knowledge
and innovations. IP protection provides inventors with limited monopoly power,
increasing their ability to appropriate the beneﬁts created by their research eﬀort
2(Friedman et al., 1991). The ﬁrm producing innovations which are protected by
patent is able to price its product above the marginal cost of production. Thereby it
appropriates proﬁt that would otherwise be passed on to consumers through lower
prices. Intellectual property right (IP) laws have been used to provide incentives for
inventors, and ﬁrms to invest in research.
There are various IP protection methods which allow to apply for diﬀerent forms
of knowledge or diﬀerent strategies of protection1. We can distinguish the IP Rights
(IP) from the non-statutory means. Among IP, patents, Copyrights and trademarks
are the most common forms. They allow to protect diﬀerent forms of knowledge.
A patent is arguably the strongest form of IP. It confers to the inventor the sole
right to exclude others from economically exploiting the innovation (by making
it, using it, selling it, and so on) for a limited time2. However, the disclosure
requirement generates for the patent holder some disutilities that might outweigh
the monopoly beneﬁts. First, a patent highlights a presumably proﬁtable technology
ﬁeld. This enables competitors to jump onto a technological trend by conducting
further research related to the patented technology. Second, publicly available patent
information facilitates reverse engineering of an invention and may thus encourage
rival ﬁrms to invent around a patent3.
As for copyrights, they protect original works of authorship. Unlike patents,
there is no novelty or usefulness requirement, although there are conditions of orig-
inality (the work has not been copied) and authorship.
A trademark is a sign, word, symbol, or device that distinguishes the goods or
services of a ﬁrm from those of others. No novelty or originality is necessary, but
the main requirement is distinctiveness. Trademarks are valid if they are registered.
Protection of trademarks does not have a time limit, provided the trademarks are
used and renewed periodically.
Due to the disadvantages of the disclosure requirement for legal means of protec-
tion, some ﬁrms may prefer using non-statutory mechanisms which do not require
disclosure. We can quote secrecy, complexity of product, lead-time. Trade secrets
cover any information a ﬁrm may have -including formulae, devices, methods, tech-
niques, processes, etc.- that confers an advantage over competitors which do not
have the information. For trade secret protection to apply, the general requirement
is that reasonable eﬀorts be undertaken to maintain secrecy. More speciﬁcally, pro-
tection is extended against another party’s discovery by inappropriate means, but a
trade secret oﬀers no protection against independent discovery or reverse engineer-
ing. In both the Yale and Carnegie Mellon surveys, secrecy appears to be the most
important mechanism for appropriating innovations. Complexity of products and
manufacturing processes may also provide a mechanism for ﬁrms to appropriate their
innovations. Many products rely on integration of wide range of diﬀerent technolo-
gies, components and systems. The integration between these diﬀerent technologies
often requires deep knowledge of component technologies and ability to specify the
1Indeed, ﬁrms also increasingly use IP-based strategies for other purposes than protection
against imitation.
2For most countries this time period is now 20 years from the date of ﬁling.
3These drawbacks were reduced in the United States thank to the use of submarine patents but
the latter oﬃcially do not exist anymore.
3interfaces between diﬀerent sub-systems (Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001). In
this way, ﬁrms may rely on the fact that producing the product requires considerable
specialized capital investment and capabilities in manufacturing that are not easily
replicated (Utterback, 1994).
In all these cases of non-statutory means, many ﬁrms make extensive eﬀorts to
control the communication ﬂows between their workers and the external environ-
ment. Non-disclosure, conﬁdentiality and subsequent employment agreements are
often used to ensure that trade secrets and speciﬁc skills are retained inside the ﬁrm
(Roebben, 2005; Galia and Legros, 2003). Such practices are likely complemen-
tary to various incentive-based reward and remuneration schemes (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1994) that reduces turnover.
The discussion above suggests that there are a large range of mechanisms of IP
protection. No single mechanism is able to provide ﬁrms with perfect protection
for their innovations. Diﬀerent mechanisms may be used at the same time for a
given innovation (Cohen et al., 2000; Arora, 1997). Moreover diﬀerent elements of
an innovation may be protected by more than one protection tool.
2.2 Choice of a IP means of protection
2.2.1 Traditional factors
Economic literature tries to understand if there is a hierarchy between the diﬀer-
ent forms of IP protection. The use of patent versus secret seems to be the most
studied in the theoretical and empirical literature (Hussinger, 2006; Anton and Yao,
2004; Arundel, 2001, Horstmann et al., 1985). Theoretical models (Harter, 1993;
Scotchmer and Green, 1990, Horstmann et al., 1985) focus on the invention level and
identify which IP tool is most suitable for a particular innovation. Anton and Yao
(2004) show that large inventions are protected primarily through secrecy and small
inventions, much less imitated, through patents. Levin et al. (1987) and Arundel
(2001) conclude that ﬁrms prefer secrecy over patenting to protect their IP and also
that ﬁrms retrospectively consider secrecy more eﬀective than patenting. Levin et
al. (1987) show that patents are not the most important mechanism of IP appro-
priation. Secrecy and learning advantages as well sales and service eﬀorts are more
important. Nevertheless, they detect signiﬁcant inter-industry variation regarding
the use of IP protection instruments because of the diﬀerent value of patents as a
means of appropriating investments in innovation (Harabi, 1995, in Arundel and
Kabla (1998)). In the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, patents are most
often used and are considered to be more eﬀective than in other industries sector
because the cost of copying an innovation is considerably less than the initial cost
of invention. Moreover, the nature of innovation seems to account. Indeed, product
innovations are better suited to patent protection than process innovations (Arundel
and Kabla, 1998). Indeed, ﬁrms avoid patenting process innovations because of the
diﬃculty in detecting infringement. Finally, empirical studies indicate that small
and medium-sized ﬁrms do not use IP in the same way as larger ﬁrms. Arundel and
Kabla (1998) show that patent propensity rates increase with ﬁrm size. Baldwin
and Hanel (2003) conﬁrm this result with Canadian data. The preference of small
ﬁrms for secrecy is presumably due to their lack of ﬁnancial resources needed to
4protect their patents.
2.2.2 Human resources factor
The heterogeneity of the ﬁrms’ performances is based on the nature and the quality of
their speciﬁc assets, and particularly immaterial assets such as knowledge. However,
knowledge cannot be acquired easily on market as it is partly tacit (Polanyi) and
embedded in workers. It must be continuously updated and improved. In this
perspective, ﬁrms develop human resources management to keep and improve these
speciﬁc competences as their loss (by the departure of the workers for instance)
could create an important deﬁcit. Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz (2001) ﬁnd that
training and R&D stock positively inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s productivity. Laursen and
Foss (2000) and Laursen and Mahnke (2000) show that new practices in human
resource management such as training, delegation of the decisions at the level of the
workers who possess the information, rotation on the posts spreading the knowledge
etc. favour innovation. More recently few studies consider that human resources
management can inﬂuence the strategic choice of the ﬁrms and specially the choice of
the means of IP protection. Thus, Roebben (2005) shows that strategies undertaken
to gain employees loyalty lead to use more secret than patent. When ﬁrms have
a high rate of engineers’ resignation they prefer patent strategy to limit risks of
information diﬀusion.
2.2.3 Complementarity of the means of protection
Most of the studies analyse the choice of patent versus secret. Hanel (2008) proposes
to enlarge the study of the diﬀerent IP. He analyses how the use of IPs is correlated
with how the ﬁrm innovates and with ﬁrms’ characteristics and sector eﬀects. He
argues that innovation and IP determine each other. So IP variables appear among
explanatory variables in the innovation equation and innovation variables in the IP
equations. A drawback of this study (Hanel, 2008) is that it does not take into
account the correlation between the diﬀerent IPs strategies4. Patents, secrecy and
others IPs are not always mutually exclusive appropriation methods. As mentioned
above, a ﬁrm could use secrecy to protect an invention during a development phase
and then rely on patents or other appropriation methods when the invention is on
the market (Hussinger, 2006). Secrecy might also be used in order to protect process
innovation.
The literature shows that according to the nature and the level of innovation,
the sector and their characteristics, ﬁrms choose between the diﬀerent forms of
protection. However, only few of them take into account the role of human resources
management as a means to improve competencies. Following Roebben, we then
suppose that the existence of speciﬁc human resources strategies, which try to keep
employees in the ﬁrms could explained the use of non-statutory means. Moreover,
most of the studies focus on the choice of patent versus secrecy. As a consequence,
they rarely analyse the potential complementarities of the mechanisms.
4The author only uses a series of two-way contingency tables classifying ﬁrms by the impact of
innovation on proﬁtability and as users and non-users of each IP.
5The aim of this paper is then to determine how the use of intellectual property
means of protection by French ﬁrms is related to their characteristics, activities,
human resources strategies, competitive strategies and industry sector in which they
operate.
3 The model
In order to protect their innovations from being copied by competitors, innovators
have to choose among diﬀerent forms of IPs and non-statutory means. Their deci-
sion can then be modelled by binary variables. These latter are based on whether
or not a ﬁrm uses patents, use trade secrets, use trade marks, copyrights, design
registration, lead-time advantage over competitors, complexity of product design,
copyright, technology advantage. Each variable takes a value of one if the particular
property right is used and a value of zero if not. In order to identify the determi-
nants of use of IPs, we use a multivariate probit model (Greene, 2000). The choice
of an IP mechanism can inﬂuence the choice of another.
The multivariate probit model generalizes the bivariate probit model which is
a natural extension of the probit model. It allows more than one equation with
correlated disturbances. Then, the disturbances across equations are allowed to be
freely correlated. The basic formulation for a bivariate probit model is as follows:
y

i1 = 1 + 
0
1xi1 + ui1 (1)
where yi1 = 1 if y
i1 > 0, and 0 otherwise.
y

i2 = 2 + 
0
2xi2 + ui2 (2)
where yi2 = 1 if y
i2 > 0, and 0 otherwise, i = 1;:::;n, E (ui1) = E (ui2) = 0,
V ar(ui1) = V ar(ui2) = 1, and Cov (ui1;ui2) = 
In other words, the disturbances (ui1;ui2) have a bivariate normal distribution,
i.e. (ui1;ui2)  BV N (0;0;1;1;). In this paper, the multivariate probit model in-
cludes seven equations estimating the diﬀerent IPs’ strategies of ﬁrms. The answers
are binary variables.
Each of the IPs strategy is then modelled as a latent variable by a standard probit
model. The general speciﬁcation of the multivariate probit model is as follows:
y

ij = j + 
0
jxij + uij (3)
where yij = 1 if y
ij > 0, and 0 otherwise, i = 1;:::;n, j = 1;:::;7, where
the observations are indexed by i and the IPs by j. We use the same explanatory
variables xij for each of the seven equations.
The equations disturbances uij have a multivariate normal distribution with
mean vector 0 and covariance matrix with diagonal elements (i.e. variances) equal
to 1 (see Greene, 2000).
64 Data and variables
This section presents the databases used and explains the choice of the variables. We
use four databases. The Community Innovation Survey (CIS4) conducted in 2004
in France provides information about the means of protection, the types of innova-
tion, the technology push and market pull situation, the existence of cooperation
and subsidies, the level of external R&D and the belonging to a group. The R&D
database, which comes from the French Ministry of Research, provides information
on the stock of ﬁrms research expenditures in 2001. The Annual Survey of Firms
(EAE) conducted in 2001 provides us with information about the individual char-
acteristics of ﬁrms such as size, sector. It enables us to build indicators on market
share and the number of competitors. The DADS database gives us information
on the strategy chosen to gain employees’ loyalty in 2001. We use data from 2001
and 2004 in order to introduce a time lag between R&D and the results of R&D.
Merging these databases, we obtain a ﬁnal sample of 5295 ﬁrms which innovate and
a sample of 3547 ﬁrms which use at least one means of IP protection.
Our dependent variable is the type of IP5. The relevant CIS question asks each
respondent what IP it use to protect its innovation. The IP include patents, trade se-
cret, design registration, lead-time advantage over competitors, complexity of prod-
uct design, copyright, technology advantage. The variables are described in table
??.
We consider that the nature of innovation can have an impact on the probability
to choose one means of protection (Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Cohen et al., 2000).
We distinguish four types: the product (good or service) innovation, the innovation
in production or manufacturing processes of goods or services, the innovation in
methods of logistics, supply or distribution of raw materials, goods or services and
the innovation in activities of support, like activities of maintenance or purchase, of
accountancy... This distinction allows us to test the impact of diﬀerent types of
process innovation.
Arundel (2001) considers that several additional factors inﬂuence the relative
importance of one IP. He shows that ﬁrms, whatever their size, consider secrecy as
being relatively more important than patents, but small ﬁrms ﬁnd secrecy to be of
greater importance than larger ﬁrms. One of the reasons is that the cost of patenting
constitutes in relative terms a higher expense for small ﬁrms than for large ones.
Therefore we add in the model the size of ﬁrm measured by the number of employees.
We also test the role of the market share in the choice of the IP. Indeed, we can
suppose that the IP strategy diﬀers when the ﬁrm is a leader or a follower. We also
consider that the strategy can diﬀer when ﬁrm belongs to a group. We introduce a
variable which distinguishes independent ﬁrms, ﬁrms belonging to a French group,
ﬁrms belonging to a foreign group. Indeed, we suppose that ﬁrms belonging to a
group have an easy access to the patent administration. Moreover, foreign groups
could prefer patenting as they are present on various markets.
Another important characteristic of a ﬁrm is its R&D expenditures. These could
increase the proportion of inventions that are patentable. A positive eﬀect of R&D
5To make the reading easier, we use the expression IP to refer to legal and non-statutory means
of protection.
7expenditures is attempted. The CIS database allows to distinguish internal from
external R&D. We then introduce two variables, assuming that the strategy can
diﬀer according to the place where R&D is conducted. Moreover, we introduce a
dummy variable to identify ﬁrms that receive subsidies from the French government
or the European Union. Indeed, ﬁrms that obtain State funds could be more sensitive
to IP.
There are large diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of IPs by sector of activity. The
diﬀerences can be partly captured by including sector dummies in the model. The
drawback is that it does not provide with any information on which aspect of each
sector inﬂuences the eﬀectiveness of IPs. An alternative approach is to try to identify
the sector factors that inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of appropriation means. Therefore
we introduce two sets of three dummies variables for controlling the demand pull
eﬀect and the technology push eﬀect. We also introduce the number of competitors.
Indeed, the intensity of competition could increase the value of patents (Arundel
and Kabla, 1998). As we think that theses variables do not take into account all
sector eﬀects, we add binary variables for the belonging to a sector.
Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) ﬁnd that ﬁrms that participate in collaborative
R&D are more likely to apply for a patent than ﬁrms that do not. Alternatively,
ﬁrms that focus strongly on internal information sources give greater emphasis to
secrecy. The CIS contains information about cooperative arrangements with other
ﬁrms. We include in the regression model a binary variable that equals one if ﬁrm
has cooperation with other ﬁrms.
Following Roebben (2005), we consider that human resources strategy can in-
ﬂuence the choice of IP. To test this assumption, we introduce three variables of
employees’ loyalty mechanisms. The ﬁrst indicates if the ﬁrm implements a major
strategy to encourage employees to stay in the ﬁrm. The second identiﬁes if the
ﬁrm oﬀers higher fringe beneﬁts that the average level in the sector. The last one
speciﬁes if the ﬁrm proposes higher wages than the average level in the sector. Fi-
nally, the variable “Training in R&D” indicates if the ﬁrm trains its researchers. The
continuous variables are in logarithm.
5 Results
The estimation of the multivariate probit model enables us to distinguish diﬀerent
strategies in the use of protection means. The results are presented in table ??. We
begin with a vertical reading of the table and discuss the determinants and rationales
of each type of protection. We then discuss the results for each explanatory variable.
5.1 Multivariate probit results
The results suggest that the probability of using trade secret is positively inﬂuenced
by the development of process innovation inside the ﬁrm and the strategy of devel-
oping employees’ loyalty, notably thanks to higher wages, in comparison with the
other ﬁrms of the same sector. These results conﬁrm previous results (Roebben,
2005; Arundel, 2001). Concerning the nature of innovation, our results diﬀer from
that of Hanel, which shows no impact of the nature of innovation. This diﬀerence can
8be linked to diﬀerent strategies and laws to patent in Canada and Europe. Indeed,
the scope of patent protection was expanded in 1989 (Hanel, 2006). Moreover, the
probability increases with the level of internal and external R&D activities, which
conﬁrms Hanel’s results on Canadian ﬁrms. The positive impact of the existence of
relations of cooperation and the obtaining of R&D subsidies is more surprising as
we supposed that cooperation would lead to patenting. However, it is true that in
some sectors such as Knowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS), there are few
patents and many collaborations. We can suppose that as soon as the collaboration
contract is well written, secrecy or other means of protection can be also eﬃcient.
In this context, the innovation development is driven by a technology push process.
The probability to use secret also increases when ﬁrms belong to intermediate goods
industry and decreases when they belong to the sectors of service to customers and
real estate business.
The probability of using the complexity of design is positively inﬂuenced by the
development of product innovation and innovation in activities of support, the level
of R&D activities, the existence of relations of cooperation and the existence of
R&D subsidies. This probability is reduced by the size of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrms using
the complexity of design have a strategy of gaining their employees’ loyalty which is
not characterized by the fringe beneﬁts but rather by activities of training in R&D.
The innovation is driven by technology push and not by market pull process. This
strategy is rather used by ﬁrms from intermediate goods industry and unused by
ﬁrms specialized in services to customers.
The probability of using lead-time advantage on competitors is positively aﬀected
by the development of product and process innovation, in a context of technology
push. Firms which use this strategy conduct R&D activities in cooperation. They
are rather small, receive subsidies and have a strategy of retaining their employees,
which is notably characterized by activities of training in R&D. They are ﬁrms from
consumption goods, intermediate goods and car industries.
There are a strong similarity between ﬁrms which have a strategy of complexity of
design and those which have a strategy of lead-time advantage. We can suppose that
these are the same ﬁrms which have diﬀerent strategies according to the nature of
the innovation. However, we note a small sector diﬀerence. The correlation between
the two strategies, indicated by the  coeﬃcient is high (57,5%). The presentation
of these three strategies based on non-statutory6 means of protection, shows that
there are diﬀerent forms of strategies but that they are highly correlated.
The probability of patenting is positively inﬂuenced by the development of prod-
uct innovation and the belonging to a French or foreign group. It increases also
when ﬁrms have large size and share market, cooperate, perform internal and ex-
ternal R&D, and receive subsidies. All these results conﬁrm the previous studies
(Arundel, 2001; Hanel, 2008). These ﬁrms are from industry and not from services.
They oﬀer fringe beneﬁts to their employees. However, we can not conclude that it
is a strategy of retaining employees, because it can also be linked to the diﬀerent
advantages proposed by large ﬁrms. This suggestion is conﬁrmed by the fact that
6We use the term non-statutory protection to diﬀerentiate the secrecy, the complexity of design
and lead-time advantage on competitors from legal means of protection which beneﬁt from legal
framework.
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The probability of using the registration of design to protect innovation is posi-
tively inﬂuenced by the development of product innovation and innovation in meth-
ods of logistics, supply or distribution of raw materials, goods or services. It increases
with the market share of the ﬁrm and if the market is competitive. Firms which
choose this strategy have external R&D (and not internal) and belong to the con-
sumer goods industry. They have a strong strategy to retain their employees, which
is mainly based on fringe beneﬁts, rather than higher wages.
The probability of using trademark as a means of protection is positively aﬀected
by the development of product and innovation in methods of logistics, supply or
distribution of raw materials, goods or services, the belonging to a group and a
strategy of fringe beneﬁts. The probability increases when ﬁrms are large, have
an important market share and there are few competitors. These ﬁrms perform
external R&D activities. The probability of using trademark is negatively inﬂuenced
by ﬁrms which belong to industry and which have process innovation. These results
are only partly similar to Hanel (2008) who ﬁnds that trademark is more developed
in competitive context. However, the criteria of using trademark could be diﬀerent
in Canada and Europe.
The probability of using copyright is positively inﬂuenced by the development of
innovation in activities of support, the belonging to a group, the strategy of retaining
employees thanks to higher wages and external R&D activities. It is surprising that
it is also inﬂuenced by training in R&D whereas these ﬁrms are not characterized
by R&D activities. That would conﬁrm the importance of developing absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) when ﬁrms contract out their R&D. Firms
which choose this strategy have a high market share, do not belong to industry and
evolve in a competitive environment.
These results show that there are diﬀerent strategies to explain the use of one
type of means of protection. However, we note some similarities between legal
means of protection (except patenting) on the one hand, and the other means of
protection. These similarities are conﬁrmed by the coeﬃcients of correlation of the
 coeﬃcients. One surprising result is that patenting is not correlated to any non-
statutory means of protection. It would mean that ﬁrms choose rather between legal
and non-statutory protection and then among these two types, they choose the one
which is more eﬃcient according to their characteristics and the innovation they
produce.
5.2 Results’ discussion
5.2.1 The ﬁrm’s characteristics
The size of the ﬁrms positively inﬂuences the decision to patent and to use trademark
and negatively aﬀects the decision to use complexity of design, lead-time advantage
on competitors to protection innovation. That means that the size of the ﬁrms has
an impact on the type of IP protection. Large ﬁrms prefer legal method of protection
whereas small ﬁrms prefer other less formal types. This distinction could be linked
to the cost of the protection. This result conﬁrms previous studies (Cohen et al.,
2000).
10The results show that the R&D level has an impact on the choice of patenting
and of using non-statutory means of protection. That could mean that the other
forms of protection are more concerned by non-R&D innovation. This assumption is
conﬁrmed by the fact that the existence of R&D cooperations and subsidies inﬂuence
in the same direction, the choice of the means of protection. Firms which use one
legal protection means (except patent) seem to prefer to externalize their R&D. We
can note that patenting and the use of trade secret are inﬂuenced both by internal
and external R&D. The organization of R&D would thus partly explain the diﬀerent
strategies of protection.
The level of market share has an impact on the choice of each means of legal
protection. The higher the market share, the more the ﬁrm tries to protect itself
against imitation. Finally, belonging to a group positively inﬂuences the choice of a
legal protection means, except the registration of design, conﬁrming Hanel (2006).
This result can be linked to the one concerning the size of ﬁrms and the market
share. Large ﬁrms, with high market share and belonging to a group, prefer legal
protection. Two reasons can explain these results. First the cost of legal protection
could limit its access to small and independent ﬁrms. Secondly, large ﬁrms could
need more legal means to protect themselves against competitors as they could be
more confronted with counterfeit. It is important to note that the nationality of
the group does not modify the results. However, the impact is generally reinforced
when it is a foreign group.
The characteristics of the ﬁrms and more speciﬁcally the size, the group and the
organisation of R&D inﬂuence the means of protection used.
5.2.2 The nature of innovation
The nature of innovation has a strong inﬂuence on the means of protection used, but
it is not very discriminatory for product innovation. This latter could lead to the
use of patent, trademark, complexity of design, lead-time advantage on competitors
and registration of design. The possibilities of protection are then very large for
product innovation. This result diﬀers from previous studies, which consider that
production innovation leads to more patenting. This can be linked to the fact that
previous studies only compare patent versus secrecy. We note anyway that product
innovation has no inﬂuence on secrecy. This can be an explanation of the diﬀerence
between patent and secrecy strategy. The impact of the other innovations seems
more speciﬁc. The innovation in production or manufacturing processes of goods or
services leads only to the use of secrecy and lead-time advantage on competitors.
This result can be explained by the nature of innovation which is easier to hide
to competitor. These innovations strongly reduce the probability to use trademark.
This result is not surprising as process innovation is less sold than other innovations.
The innovation in methods of logistics, supply or distribution of raw materials, goods
or services positively inﬂuences trademark and registration of design. The innovation
in activities of support, like activities of maintenance or purchase, or accountancy
aﬀects the probability to use complexity of design and copyright. To conclude, the
type of process innovations inﬂuences the method of protection. Product innovation
can lead to almost every means of protection.
115.2.3 Strategy of retaining employees
One of our assumptions was to consider that human resources strategy inﬂuences
the choice of intellectual property’s protection means. To test this assumption we
introduce diﬀerent variables. The results are not as strong as we thought. Indeed,
having a strategy that encourages employees to stay in the ﬁrm inﬂuences every
means of protection except patenting. Can we conclude that it is a sign of a speciﬁc
strategy as soon as innovation cannot be protected by patent? We obtain more
signiﬁcant results when we distinguish diﬀerent types of action. Fringe beneﬁts
inﬂuence the use of legal protection, except copyright. But is it the sign of a speciﬁc
human capital strategy or one aspect of the characteristics of the ﬁrm (size and
market share)? More interesting is that higher wages positively inﬂuence the use of
secret and copyright. When knowledge is strategic and protected by secret, ﬁrms
could try to encourage their employees to stay as the means of protection do not
allow legal pursuit against them in case they use or sell the knowledge protected
by secret. Finally, training expenditure on R&D activities has a positive impact on
copyright, complexity of design, lead-time advantage on competitors. That means
that in these cases, ﬁrms are ready to invest on-the-job training, considering that
employees would stay and that R&D needs to be reinforced. To conclude, we can
say that human resource strategy could impact the choice of protection but the
action used varies according to the type of protection. Fringe beneﬁts explain legal
protection, higher wages are rather linked with secret and copyright, R&D training
inﬂuence non-statutory protection, except secret.
We conﬁrm the importance of human resource strategy in the choice of means
of protection (Roebben, 2005). Human resource strategy to retaining employees
could be interpreted as the sign of trust inside ﬁrms. However, our results diﬀer
a little from those of Roebben (2005). He shows that investment in on-the-job
training increases the use of secrecy while wages policy has no signiﬁcant impact.
The diﬀerence can be linked to the fact that our variables are not built in the same
manner. Indeed, Roebben had the possibility to use expense in training, while we
only have information on the organisation of training or not. Moreover, we test the
correlation between diﬀerent types of protection, which is not the case of Roebben
(2005).
5.2.4 Market characteristics
Our results show that technology push situations increase the probability to use
secrecy and complexity of design, and decrease the probability to use lead-time
advantage and trademark. Market-pull innovation has little inﬂuence on the strategy
of protection. It has only a negative impact on the probability to use complexity of
design and lead-time advantage on competitors.
The number of competitors in the industry does not have any impact on the
probability to use non-statutory protection means or patent. It positively inﬂuences
the probability to use registration of design or copyright and negatively impacts
the probability to use trademark. The structure of the market partly inﬂuences the
choice of a means of protection.
Finally, we consider that sector-based speciﬁcities play an important role in the
12choice of the type of protection. Indeed, the sector variables have a strong impact on
the choice of protection. Thus, ﬁrms from intermediate goods industry have a higher
probability to use secrecy and complexity of design. Firms specialized in services
to consumers have a negative impact on the probability to use secrecy, complex-
ity of design, lead-time advantage on competitors. Industrial ﬁrms have a higher
probability to patent than service ﬁrms which do not use it. Firms from consumer
goods industry have a strong inﬂuence on the probability to use registration of de-
sign. Finally, industrial ﬁrms negatively inﬂuence the probability to use trademark
or copyright to protect innovation. We can wonder if these results can be explained
by the nature of the activities and of the knowledge created in each sector, or by
their diﬀerent cultures. Further researches in this direction are needed.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this article was to go further in the knowledge of the choice of IP
protection means by the ﬁrms. We were able to test seven means of protection. We
use multivariate probit model in order to take into account the correlation between
the equations, as ﬁrms can use diﬀerent methods of protection. Our estimations test
diﬀerent types of variables to explain the strategy of IP protection, which had not
been done before, according to our knowledge of the literature. Indeed, we test the
impact of the nature of the innovation, ﬁrm’s characteristics but also of the human
resources strategy.
The main results of our study is that the choice of IP protection method can
be explained by the nature of innovation, the strategy of gaining employees’ loyalty,
the size and market share of the ﬁrm, its R&D activities, its belonging to a group
and its sector. The table ?? sums up each strategy and allow to identify the dif-
ferences between the protection means. It appears that big ﬁrms with high market
share, belonging to a group, use more legal IP protection. The organisation of R&D
activities inﬂuences the type of IP protection. Non-statutory means of protection
are particularly used for process innovation and when the innovation is pushed by
technology (and not by market). There could have a will not to disclose information
and thus keep advantage on competitors. Hence, the choice of a protection means
is not neutral and results from a complex strategy.
Our study shows that the choice of IP protection depends on diﬀerent factors
In this context, public policy should take them into account to encourage all IP
protection instead of focusing mainly on patenting. However, further research is
needed to take into account other human resource strategies such as bonus or the
level of the diploma. Moreover, it would be very interesting to have panel data to
analyse the evolution of the ﬁrm IP strategy.
13Table 1: Variables and data
Explained variables
Secrecy 1 if the ﬁrm uses secrecy CIS4
Complexity of design






Internal R&D Logarithm of the stock of intern R&D expenses R&D survey 1986-2001
Size Logarithm of the number of employees EAE 2001
Part group 1 if the ﬁrm is part of a domestic group,
2 if the ﬁrm is part of a foreign group, 0 otherwise. CIS4
Market shares Logarithm of the share of the company’s total sales
on total sales of the industry. EAE 2001
External R&D Logarithm of the external R&D expenses CIS4
Cooperation 1 if the ﬁrm has R&D cooperation CIS4
Subsidies 1 if the ﬁrm receives R&D subsidies CIS4
Nature of the innovation
Product innovation 1 if the ﬁrm declares to have introduced a product CIS4
(good or service) innovation, 0 otherwise
Process innovation 1 if the ﬁrm declares to have introduced an innovation
in production or manufacturing processes of goods
or services, 0 otherwise
Logistics innovation 1 if the ﬁrm declares to have introduced an innovation
in methods of logistics, supply or distribution of
continued on next page ...
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raw materials, goods or services, 0 otherwise
Support innovation 1 if the ﬁrm declares to have introduced an innovation
in activities of support, like activities of maintenance
or purchase, of accountancy, 0 otherwise
Strategy of fostering the employees’ loyalty
- Human resources strategy 1 if the ﬁrm implements a major strategy to encourage CIS4
employees to stay in the ﬁrm
- Fringe beneﬁts 1 if the ﬁrm proposes higher fringes beneﬁts than DADS
the average level in the sector (NAF36)
- Wages 1 if the ﬁrm proposes higher wages than the average level DADS
in the sector (NAF36)
Training in R&D 1 if the ﬁrm has internal or external training for CIS4
its personnel, speciﬁcally for the development and/or
introduction of innovations
Market’s characteristics
Number of competitors Logarithm of the number of competitors in the EAE
sector (NAF114)
Technology push Situation of technology push is null = 0 CIS4
Situation of technology push is weak = 1
Situation of technology push is moderate = 2
Situation of technology push is strong = 3
Market pull Situation of market pull is null = 0 CIS4
Situation of market pull is weak = 1
Situation of market pull is moderate = 2
Situation of market pull is strong = 3
Sector
Consumer goods 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the consumer goods sector EAE
continued on next page ...
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Human resources strategy 24.04
Market pull 0 27.15
Market pull 1 3.61
Market pull 2 16.24
Market pull 3 53.00
Technology pull 0 34.33
Technology pull 1 13.37
Technology pull 2 28.09






Training in R&D 49.71
Consumer goods 14.82
Car industry 4.05





Real estate business 2.58
Services to ﬁrms 27.84
Services to customers 5.16
Source : Ministère de la Recherche, SESSI, DARES and INSEE.
17Table 3: IPs by sector
Sector Secrecy Complexity Lead-time Patent Registration Trademark Copyright
of design advantage of design
Consumer goods 26.68 24.48 29.25 30.15 33.25 53.48 16.49
Car industry 33.02 27.36 41.98 46.23 30.19 30.19 7.72
Machinery and equipment 34.69 32.73 45.03 51.89 29.51 39.30 9.65
Intermediate goods 35.14 28.54 39.72 42.52 27.69 36.45 6.46
Energy 28.16 18.45 32.04 33.98 11.65 38.83 16.50
Transport 15.38 11.54 23.08 11.54 7.69 57.69 7.69
Finance 30.43 26.09 39.13 4.35 4.35 47.83 8.70
Real estate business 6.67 8.15 14.07 1.48 10.37 22.96 7.41
Services to ﬁrms 17.71 18.60 25.46 14.82 10.71 36.38 15.58
Services to customers 10.00 7.41 9.63 6.30 14.44 41.48 20.74
Source : Ministère de la Recherche, SESSI, DARES and INSEE.
Table 4: Descriptives statistics
Variable Mean Std err. Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max
R&D stock 64562.60 647521.60 0 0 0 402.32 2.34E07
Market share 2.68 7.69 0 0.106 0.419 1.779 100
Size 486.99 3564.37 0 44 105 344 125176
External R&D 602.15 8080.829 0 0 0 0 381046
Number of competitors 656.48 860.12 1 96 230 886 3860
*: Thousands of 2003 Euros.
Min: minimum, Q1: ﬁrst quartile, Q2: median, Q3: third quartile, Max: maximum.
Source : Ministère de la Recherche, SESSI, DARES and INSEE.
18Table 5: Multivariate results
Variables Secrecy Complexity Lead-time Patent Registration Trademark Copyright
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19Table 5: Multivariate results
Variables Secrecy Complexity Lead-time Patent Registration Trademark Copyright
of design advantage of design













































































































































Number of observations 3547
Log likelihood -13522.89
Wald Chi(224) 2585.30
Prob > Chi2 0.00






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21Table 7: Main characteristics of each strategy of IP protection
Secrecy Complexity Lead-time Patent Registration Trademark Copyright
of design advantage of design
Process Product Product and Product Product and Product and Support
innovation innovation and process innovation innovation logistic innovation logistic innovation innovation
innovation for
support activities
Human resources Human resources Human resources Human resources Human resources
strategy strategy (training strategy (training strategy strategy (wage




Market share Market share Market share Market share
Technology push Technology push Technology push
R&D activities R&D activities R&D activities R&D activities R&D activities R&D activities
(intern, extern, ( intern, extern, (intern, extern, (intern, extern, (extern) (extern)
cooperation, cooperation, cooperation, subsidies)
subsidies) subsidies) subsidies)
Competition No competition Competition
Intermediary Intermediary Industry Industry Consumer Service to
goods goods ﬁrms ﬁrms goods customers
2
2